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Eliminating the Mandatory Trade-off:




Facing the rising costs and time commitments required to respond to em-
ployment litigation, California employers have joined the national trend in
turning to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as the method of choice for
resolving employer-employee conflicts?1 The promulgation of this approach is
attributable to employers' perception that arbitration will yield lower damage
awards, limit the possibility of jury bias toward employees, and leverage the
business experience of arbitrators, while avoiding the negative publicity that
comes with litigation.2 In recent years, these incentives have encouraged
many employers to include mandatory or compulsory arbitration provisions in
employment contracts, by which employees agree before a dispute arises to
have the suit heard by an arbitrator rather than by a judicial officer 3
As more employers include mandatory arbitration provisions in their em-
ployment contracts, policy-makers are becoming concerned that employees
are being forced to trade their civil and statutory rights for their jobs. 4 The
California Legislature is considering legislation designed to combat this ten-
dency and to provide legal protection for employees who might otherwise be
forced to waive the right for redress of grievances, legal protections against
discrimination, and other rights.5
1. See Michele M. Buse, Comment, Contracting Employment Disputes Out of the July Sys-
tem: An Analysis of the Implementation of Binding Arbitration in the Non-Union Ibrkplace and
Proposals to Reduce the Harsh Effects of a Non-Appealable Award. 22 PEn L REV. 1485, 1496-
97 (1995).
2. Id.
3. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182. 1187 (9th Cir. 1998). The
Ninth Circuit defined an arbitration agreement as compulsory when "individuals must sign an
agreement waiving their rights to litigate future claims in a judicial forum in order to obtain em-
ployment with, or continue to work for, the employer." Id.
4. See John A. Gray, Hare the Foxes Become the Guardians of the Chickens? The Post-
Gibner Legal Status of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition of Emplokment. 37
VTi. L REv. 113, 115 (1992).
5. See Consumer Contracts: Wabiter of Fundamental Rights: Hearing on A.B. 858 Before
the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary #st Legis.. #st Reg. Sess. 8 (Cal. 1999) [hereinafter Hear-
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Although the legislation was designed to protect the constitutional rights
of employees, there are legal considerations and policy concerns that chal-
lenge the viability of this type of legislation. The primary question is whether
the act is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which states that
agreements to arbitrate claims are irrevocable and so is contrary to the pro-
posed legislation. 6
In addition to the legal concerns, there is the potential for conflict be-
tween the constitutional right of business and individuals to make contracts
and the constitutional preservation of civil rights.7 This Comment discusses
the above issues in addition to the history of legislation on arbitration provi-
sions in employment contracts in California, and the potential impact that this
line of legislation could have on individuals and business.
II. THE LEGISLATION
Public policy makers have historically sought to enact legislation de-
signed to protect the constitutional rights of citizens against opportunistic at-
tempts to force them to "voluntarily" surrender these rights."
Among the most jealously protected of these liberties is the right to peti-
tion for redress of grievances, in other words, the right to sue 9 With the na-
tional promulgation of ADR, however, employers seeking to gain the full
benefit of the alternative forum began inserting mandatory arbitration clauses
into employment contracts, thus short-circuiting the ability of employees to
bring lawsuits against their employers.' 0 Aggrieved employees who signed
these contracts without a full understanding of the ramifications were often
astonished to discover that they had surrendered the basic right to bring a suit
in a forum other than that of the employer's choosing." Employees who were
dissatisfied with the outcome of the arbitration proceeding were further
shocked to find that the outcome of an arbitration procedure could not be ap-
pealed to a judicial forum or vacated, even when based on erroneous fact or
ing(statement of Donna Hershkowitz and Drew Liebert, policy analysts).
6. See discussion infra Part IlI.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P2d 899 (Cal. 1992) (holding that an award re-
sulting from a binding arbitration is not appealable, even when the decision is based on erronc-
ous fact or law). This opinion chronicles the history of arbitration in California. Id.
9. See CAL CONST. art. I, § 16. The California constitution protects the right of citizens to
redress of grievances in a jury trial. Id.
10. See Gray, supra note 4, at 116-17.
11. See Buse, supra note 1, at 1501-02. Employees often are not aware of the conse-
quences of signing a compulsory arbitration agreement. Id.
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application of law, unless they could demonstrate that the arbitrator had ex-
hibited "corruption, fraud, or other undue
means."' 2 In Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase,13 the Supreme Court of California
held that "arbitrators are not bound to award on principles of dry law, but
may decide on principles of equity and good conscience."' 4 Furthermore, the
court noted that "courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator's reason-
ing" - in other words, the arbitrator's opinion becomes the law as far as em-
ployees are concerned.15
In an effort to prevent employees from being taken advantage of in such
situations, Californian legislators drafted legislation explicitly prohibiting em-
ployers from requiring or even requesting that employees waive specified
guaranteed privileges as a condition of employment.' 6 Among the specified
rights, the legislation included the right to a jury trial, which is protected by
both the California17 and United States Constitutions, and civil rights or rights
under the anti-discrimination laws including protection from unlawful em-
ployment discrimination under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 8 or
under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),' 9 or the Unruh
Civil Rights Act 2 In addition, the proposed legislation would prohibit the
compelled waiver of communication privileges established in the Evidence
12. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 2000) (listing grounds for
vacation of an award in an arbitration proceeding to include corruption, fraud, or other undue
means.)
13. See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 899.
14. d at 904.
15. lId
16. See CAL. Civ. CoDo § 1670.7 (West 1999) ("(it is the policy of the State of California
to ensure that employees have the full benefit of constitutional, statutory, or common law rights
and protections and that they not be coercively deprived of those rights and protections.")
17. CAL CoNssr. art. I, § 16.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (West 1999). An employer may not "fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge an individual, or otherwise discriminate against any person with respect to compcn-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based on the p-son's rae, color, religion.
sex, or national origin." Id.
19. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 (West 1999). Commonly referred to as the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act (FEHA), this provision makes it unlawful for an employer to discrim-
inate on the basis of race, religion, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability.
mental disability, medical condition, marital status, or sex. Id.
20. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 2000). The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations by a business establishment on the basis of sex, race.
color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability. Id.
3
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Code, including but not limited to the right to attorney-client privileges, 21 the
spousal privilege and the confidential marital communications privilege, the
physician-patient privilege, and the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The proposed legislation would deem any waiver requested or obtained
in violation of the above rights as beyond the reasonable expectations of the
employee and therefore involuntary, unconscionable, and void.22 To ensure
compliance, the legislation stipulates that employers who violate the statute
by requesting such a waiver would be fined five thousand dollars ($5,000) for
each violation. 23
Although this legislation would apply to individuals, it specifically would
not prohibit collective bargaining agreements that require employment-related
claims be submitted to arbitration.2 4 This exemption is supported by a pre-
sumption that labor unions are much more likely to have collective strength
sufficient to ensure a more level playing field with employers.? The legisla-
tion does not preclude individual employees from choosing to arbitrate claims
as they arise.26
Legislators originally intended to include provisions that would have ex-
tended the prohibition against mandatory arbitration clauses to insurance
agreements. 27 These provisions, which were opposed by several organizations
including insurance interests, 28 would have prohibited insurance companies
from requiring customers to waive the right to jury trial, the right to reject or
rescind a contract during statutorily mandated time periods, and the right to
legal protection against discrimination. 29 These provisions further stipulated
that such waivers of consumer rights would be void, and "deemed involun-
tary, beyond the reasonable expectations of the consumer, and
unconscionable. '30
21. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 952 (West 1999). Confidential communication between client
and lawyer refers to the transmission of information between a client and his or her lawyer in the
course of the attorney-client relationship. Id.
22. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1670.7 (West 1999).
23. Id
24. IL
25. See Buse, supra note 1, at 1511.
26. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 9. The author of the bill argued that the bill did not pro-
hibit all arbitration, but rather prohibited compulsory arbitration clauses that are acceded to,
predispute. Id.
27. Id. at 1.
28. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 18. Opposing entities included the California Association
of Professional Liability Insurers, the California Medical Association, Blue Cross of California,
and CAN Insurance Company among others. Id.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. See CAL CIv. CODE § 1670.8 (amended 1999).
4
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II LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEGISLATION
A. Compatibility with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
which applies to any contract that represents a transaction involving
interstate commerce.3' The FAA is broadly written and preempts any
state provision that interferes with interstate commerce by failing to
enforce any arbitration clause to the same extent as any other contrac-
tual provision.32 Opponents of the proposed legislation have expressed
concern that it would conflict with the FAA.33
1. The FAA.
Congress passed the FAA to place agreements to arbitrate "upon the
same footing as other contracts," thereby overcoming the previous refusal of
courts to enforce these agreements. - The FAA provides, in pertinent part, that
"[a] written provision ... to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising .. . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."35
2. Applicability of the FAA to legislation that does not specifi-
cally mention arbitration.
Whether the FAA applies to state courts and preempts state law
dealing with arbitration has been an issue of contention in recent
years, as the United States Supreme Court has sought to determine
Congress' legislative intent.36 In Southland Corp. x: Keating, the Court
examined Congress' intent and reasoned that Congress would have
wanted state and federal courts to reach the same decisions regarding
the validity of arbitration in similar cases. 37 Therefore, the Court said,
31. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. r. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265. 268 (1995).
32. Ld. at 272.
33. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 9.
34. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.. 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989)(quoting Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999).
36. See VoIt Info. Sciences, supra note 34, at 479.
37. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984). The Supreme Court held
5
Peabody: Eliminating the Mandatory Trade-off: Should Employees Have the Ri
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2000
"Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew
the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
tion.' ' 38 The Court held that the FAA is applicable to both state and
federal courts through the Commerce Clause and, therefore, the FAA
preempts conflicting state law. 39 The Court further held that state
courts could not apply state statutes that invalidated arbitration
agreements.40
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, the Court examined the
second section of the FAA which provides that "[S]tates may regulate
contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law
principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract'." 41 The Court defined the boundaries of this regulatory power
by holding that "[w]hat States may not do is decide that a contract is
fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but
not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause."' 42 The Court reasoned
that the FAA would make this type of state policy unlawful because it
"would place arbitration clauses on an 'unequal footing', directly con-
trary to the Act's language and Congress' intent."'43
The following year, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the
Court ruled that a Montana statute requiring that contracts containing
mandatory arbitration clauses provide notice of such on the first page
of the contract was preempted by the FAA because Montana's statute
only applied to those contracts "subject to arbitration." 44 The Court
reasoned that "[b]y enacting §2 [of the FAA] ...Congress precluded
States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, re-
quiring instead that such provisions be placed 'upon the same footing
as other contracts.' ,,45
that Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states
to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to re-
solve by arbitration: the FAA preempts state law on the issue of whether courts may compel ar-
bitration. Id.
38. Id at 10.
39. Id at 11.
40. Id
41. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, supra note 31, at 281 (emphasis added)(quoting 9 U.S.C. §
2 (1999).
42. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, supra note 31, at 281.
43. See Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Volt Information Services, supra note 34, at 474).
44. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
45. See id at 687 (emphasis added) (quoting Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
6
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Although the proposed legislation exhibits facial neutrality when
it does not specifically refer to arbitration, the legislation implicitly af-
fects compulsory arbitration clauses when it prohibits an employer
from requiring an employee to waive the right to a jury trial or to a
judicial forum. 46 This effect on compulsory arbitration clauses was
contemplated. The author of the legislation noted that it was designed
to protect individuals from being coerced into signing compulsory ar-
bitration agreements 47 in furtherance of the policy that was enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. 1, Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, which held that "arbi-
tration under the (Federal Arbitration) Act is a matter of consent, not
coercion . . . 4
Opponents to the proposed California legislation argue that Allied-
Bruce and Doctor's Associates preempt in situations where an em-
ployer is involved in interstate commerce, because it would create a
separate rule for local intrastate employers and another rule for em-
ployers that operate in more than one state.49 Additionally, the legisla-
tion may still be preempted if a future court finds that the text of the
law implicitly singles out arbitration, placing it on unequal footing
with the other terms of a contract50
3. The second line of defense: Does the FAA apply to employ-
ment contracts?
Even if the proposed legislation is found to single out arbitration,
courts have found in recent years that the FAA does not extend to cer-
tain areas of the law and that state statutes, including those which spe-
cifically single out arbitration, are not preempted by the FAA.5' In Gil-
mer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., Robert Gilmer was hired by
511 (1974).
46. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 13.
47. Id at 8.
48. See Volt Info. Sciences, supra note 34. at 479.
49. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 10.
50. Id at 13.
51. See Duffield, supra note 3, at 1185 (holding that employers may not compel individu-
als to waive Title VII rights to a judicial forum) cert. denied 119 S. C. 445 (1998); see also
Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)(holding that the Federal Arbitration
Act does not apply to labor or employment contracts).
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Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation and, as a condition of employ-
ment, Gilmer was required to register as a securities representative
with a number of stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE).52 When he registered with the NYSE, the application
included a stipulation that he agree to submit "any dispute, claim, or
controversy" resulting from his employment or termination of employ-
ment to arbitration. 53 At the age of sixty-two, Gilmer's employment
was terminated and he filed suit stating that he had been fired for his
age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).54 Gilmer never filed for arbitration. He feared that he would
not receive a fair hearing because he knew that the arbitration panels
were composed of industry members who, Gilmer presumed, would be
biased toward employers.5 5 In order to determine whether compulsory
arbitration in this case would compromise Congress' intent to end age
discrimination, the Supreme Court first had to determine whether the
FAA applied to an employment contract.56 Section 1 of the FAA pro-
vides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate comerce."5 7 The Court sidestepped
the issue by reasoning that a securities contract is not an employment
contract and that the FAA therefore applied, thus leaving open the
question of whether the FAA applied to employment contracts in
general. 58
In his dissent in Gilmer, Justice Stevens stated that "not only
would I find that the FAA does not apply to employment-related dis-
putes between employers and employees in general, but also I would
hold that compulsory arbitration conflicts with the congressional pur-
pose animating the ADEA, in particular. '59
The Ninth Circuit examined this issue in Duffield v. Robertson
52. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that the right
to a judicial forum for resolution of a federal age discrimination claim may be waived by an
employee).
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id.
55. See Gray, supra note 4, at 124.
56. Id at 125.
57. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
58. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n. 2 (1991) ("it would
be inappropriate to address the scope of the § I exclusion [of the FAA] because the arbitration
clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment ... rather, the arbitra-
tion clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities registration application.")
59. Id at 41.
8
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Stephens & Co.6" Tonyja Duffield, a securities broker, sued her em-
ployer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California's
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), alleging breach of con-
tract and tort claims and sexual discrimination and harassment.61 Duf-
field furthermore sought a judicial declaration that securities industry
employees could not be compelled to arbitrate employment disputes.6 -
The Duffield court held that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, em-
ployers may not require individuals to "waive their Title VII right to a
judicial forum." However, at this point the court did hold that this
did not preclude employers from "requiring employees to agree in ad-
vance to arbitrate state-law tort and contract claims (other than for a
violation of a state civil rights law)." 6
Nine months later, the Court decided the issue in Craft v. Camp-
bell Soup Company, holding that even if AB 858 is found to single
out arbitration by placing it on a separate footing from other terms of
a contract, the Ninth Circuit has found that the FAA does not extend
to employment contracts at all and that state statutes which regulate
arbitration in employment contracts are not preempted by the FAA. 5
The Craft court analyzed the rule first by looking at the legislative in-
tent behind the FAA, specifically section 2, which provides for the
enforcement of particular arbitration provisions. 67 The court, noting
60. See Duffield, supra note 3. at 1185.
61. Ald at 1186.
62. 1l
63. I. at 1185.
64. Id. at 1187. The court reasoned that allowing employers to demand that cmployees
waive their civil rights would violate the social policy of "deterring workplace discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, and national origin. M,
65. 177 F3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
66. IL at 1084 (quoting Sanchez v. Pacific Powder Co., 147 F3d 1097. 1099 (9Ithl Cir.
1998). The court defined its procedure for interpreting Congressional intent as follows: "Vien
interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the words that Congress used. Rather than focusing
just on the word or phrase at issue, this court looks to the entire statute to determine Congres-
sional intent." IL
67. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999) ("A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving conunerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controersy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid. irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.")
9
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that this was a case of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, deter-
mined that when Congress passed the FAA in 1925, the term "transac-
tion" within the FAA referred to "[a] business deal; an act involving
buying and selling,"' 6 not employment contracts. The court further de-
termined that the FAA's sole purpose was "to bind merchants who
were involved in commercial dealings."' 69 The court found that "while
neither this court nor the Supreme Court has definitely ruled on
whether the FAA applies to employment contracts, both courts have
suggested that it does not."70
4. Does the FAA apply to state legislation preventing compul-
sory arbitration agreements in employment contracts?
The question of whether the FAA preempts state legislation af-
fecting compulsory arbitration agreements will ultimately need to be
decided by the courts because, as the above decisions demonstrate,
there is no clear answer under the existing rulings.71 As to the issue of
whether the FAA preempts this legislation, the survival of the legisla-
tion depends on a narrow definition of whether it implicitly singles out
arbitration to a sufficient extent when the legislation does not explic-
itly mention arbitration. 72 Even if the courts find that the FAA does
preempt a state measure on these grounds, the second argument that
the FAA does not apply to employment contracts appears to be suffi-
cient to defend the legislation against preemption by the FAA.73
The fate of this legislation may hang on a recent decision holding
that the FAA preempted California's Health and Safety Code, which
gave consumers the right to sue their health maintenance organization
for failure to incorporate various disclosures in arbitration clauses. 74 In
Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of California, the plaintiff accused
Aetna of violating the Health and Safety Code's requirement that in-
surance subscribers be informed that they are waiving their right to a
jury trial.75
68. See Craft, supra note 51, at 1083 (quoting WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTnONARY 2688 (2d ed.
1939)).
69. Id. at 1085.
70. Id. at 1090.
71. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 9.
72. Id at 13.
73. See Craft, supra note 51, at 1094 (holding that the FAA does not apply to labor or cm-
ployment contracts).
74. Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of California, 84 Cal. Rptr 2d 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
75. Id at 650.
10
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RAISED BY THE LEGISLATION
A. Conflict of rights - The right to sign agreements versus the pres-
ervation of rights against discrimination, and preservation of the right
to a jury triaL
A major consideration behind the proposed legislation is to provide as-
surance that employees will receive the full benefit of the laws enacted for
their protection, and not be forced to give them away.76 In response, oppo-
nents of the measure argue that a side effect of the legislation is that the right
to freely create and enter into binding contracts is lost.
Mandatory arbitration agreements have only been added to employment
contracts in recent years. 8 In fact, according to one commentator, employ-
ment provisions requiring arbitration would have been "believed unthinkable"
only a few years ago.79
When California legislators presented this legislation for consideration,
employee advocates argued along with the Supreme Court that "arbitration
under the (Federal Arbitration) Act is a matter of consent, not coercion."8a
Employee advocates expressed concern that employees do not often have a
real understanding of the extent to which they are submitting to arbitration,
and that they often presume mistakenly that "their dispute will be examined
under the guiding principles of the law which govern the dispute, and that re-
view may always be had by a court." 8'
On the other hand, employer interests argue that although there is a risk
that an arbitrator may make a mistake, the parties to a compulsory arbitration
contract have agreed to "bear that risk in return for a quick, inexpensive, and
conclusive resolution to their dispute.""- Legislative analysts noted that oppo-
nents to A.B. 858, California's proposed legislation, suggested that "Califor-
nians have long been free to agree that their disputes can be resolved through
arbitration instead of the lengthy and expensive litigation process ....
76. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 7.
77. Id. at 9.
78. See Gray, supra note 4, at 114.
79. Id
80. See Volt Info. Sciences, supra note 34, at 479.
81. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 9 (quoting Moncharsh, supra note 8, at 904).
82. See Moncharsh, supra note 8, at 904.
11
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[Under AB 858,J citizens would have no choice but to go to court."'83 How-
ever, the author of the measure argued that statistics do not reflect that arbi-
tration is necessarily a faster and cheaper approach to dispute resolution and
that this legislation merely prohibits contracts which require employees to
"accede to predispute mandatory arbitration.' ' 4
Although opponents of mandatory arbitration clauses frequently express
fears that employers somehow prefer arbitration because it gives them an ad-
vantage by providing less protection for employees' rights, this fear may not
be entirely justified because employers may actually prefer mandatory arbitra-
tion for its efficiency, privacy, and finality.85 The concern that remains is that
the "voluntary" submission to arbitration may in fact be more of a "take it
or leave it" coercion of an adhesive contract despite the fact that the em-
ployer, in return, is theoretically foregoing his or her right to take the em-
ployee to court.8 6
The Supreme Court in Gilmer noted that "[m]ere inequality in bargain-
ing power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements
are never enforceable in the employment context."87 As such, employment
contracts with compulsory arbitration provisions are enforceable to the same
extent that other contracts of adhesion are enforceable under state law.88
Perhaps the California Court of Appeals best described the relationship
between the liberties for redress of grievances, and other rights such as the
right to enter into contracts, when it reasoned:
[the rights to] petition for a redress of grievances are among the most precious of the lib-
erties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These rights, moreover, are intimately connected,
both in origin and in purpose, with other First Amendment rights of free speech and free
press. 'All these, though not identical, are inseparable.' . . . The First Amendment
would, however, be a hollow promise if it left government free to destroy or erode its
guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed that prohibits free speech,
press, petition, or assembly as such. We have therefore repeatedly held that laws which
actually affect the exercise of these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they
were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative com-
petence, or even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such
an evil."' 9
83. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 9.
84. Id.
85. See Gray, supra note 4, at 116-17.
86. Id. at 117-18.
87. See Gilmer, supra note 58, at 33.
88. See Gray, supra note 4, at 129.
89. See Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank. 53 Cal. App. 4th 43, 55-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(emphasis added) (quoting Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).
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V. IMPACT OF THE LEGISLATION
A. Existing Law
Currently, employees required to sign employment contracts in which
they submit to arbitration or waive rights to anti-discrimination protections
are not wholly without legal recourse in the event that
such rights are abridged." In general, the law regulates the formation of con-
tracts, including employment contracts. Statutory protections stipulate that any
person may waive the advantage of a law intended only for his or her benefit,
but that a law cannot be waived by private agreement if it is established for a
reason of public policy.9' In addition, courts are authorized to refuse to en-
force a contract, in its entirety or only a provision of it, if the court finds that
the contract was unconscionable when created.Y
B. Changes to Existing Law
However, under this proposed legislation, employers would no longer be
permitted to require or even request that employees waive their constitutional
rights or privileges in order to secure employment 93 This proposed legisla-
tion, which depends on the application of the above provisions, appears to de-
fine the application of existing law rather than provide additional
protectionsf4
C. The Incentive to Litigate
Opponents to legislation prohibiting compulsory arbitration agreements in
the employer-employee relationship have expressed concern that employees
will be more willing to fight a court battle than submit to arbitration if such
legislation is passed.95 However, the cost benefits and increased efficiency of
90. See Gray, supra note 4, at 133. An individual under an arbitration agreement can still
file with the E.E.O.C. See it. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27).
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 ,West 1999).
92. CAt. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1999).
93. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 2. Existing law provides many protections available to
all contracts. Section 1670.7 provides a structure for the application or these protections. id.
94. a)
95. It. at 9.
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arbitration in a proper forum are attractive to employees as well as to em-
ployers.96 Because there is no provision barring employees from agreeing to
arbitration once a dispute arises, arbitration would continue to be a viable al-
teMative.97 An additional benefit of reserving the decision to arbitrate until
the dispute arises is that employers who wish to arbitrate will need to make
their arbitration procedures attractive enough that employees will choose arbi-
tration over litigation."
D. Fiscal Impact
It is difficult to assess the extent of the fiscal impact of the proposed
legislation because the number of employees choosing arbitration as a result
of more attractive arbitration proceedings has yet to be determined.99
VI. CONCLUSION
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 2001. Austin is an engineer who does
excellent work and makes a good income. At the age of 62, the same age as
Robert Gilmer, he is contemplating retirement in three or four years, and is
earnestly putting money into his retirement account. One day, he comes to
work and is terminated when a younger employee, whom he has trained,
takes his job.' °° If this legislation is passed, Austin may file with the EEOC
and then independently make the choice whether to litigate or arbitrate.' 0' His
employer, nervous about the prospect of facing litigation, has created a strong
arbitration program that promotes fair and reasonable outcomes for both the
employer and the employee. Because of its efficiency and cost-effectiveness,
Austin chooses arbitration and receives a decent settlement from an indepen-
dent arbitrator.102 The case is finished in much less time and in a far more
cost-effective manner than going through the court system. 03
96. See Buse, supra note 1, at 1489-1501 (discussing the increased use of ADR in general,
and the benefits for both parties).
97. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 2.
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id. at 5 (the fiscal effect of the legislation is unknown).
100. See Gilmer, supra note 58, at 22.
101. Id. at 27.
102. See Hearing, supra note 5, at 14. The Consumers Union (CU) noted, "one result of
the bill will be that businesses who want to arbitrate with their customers [or employees] will
have to make arbitration sufficiently attractive that the customer [or employee] will choose it af-
ter the dispute arises. Id.
103. See Buse, supra note 1, at 1497-1500.
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Arbitration is a very attractive option when it is conducted properly, and
now that employees once again do have the right to choose whether to arbi-
trate or litigate, employers will have the incentive they need to make sure
that their arbitration procedures present a truly level playing field and are not
the "kangaroo courts" that employees fear.1°4 While there are challenges to
the viability of this option under the FAA, there is enough latitude for the
courts to affirm the validity of this legislation. 0 5 The conflict of rights which
opponents cite between the right to sign contracts and the right of access to a
judicial forum is not intensified simply because employers can no longer co-
erce their employees into signing contracts which, though legal, may have
negative results.106
In order to make arbitration a truly attractive and viable alternative, em-
ployees must be given the information they need to make the informed deci-
sion whether to participate. 07 With the introduction of fairness that this legis-
lation would provide, the arbitration process would achieve the goals of cost-
effective, efficient, and just dispute resolution.
104. See Hearing, supra note 5. at 2.
105. See discussion infra Part IlL
106. See discussion infra Part IV.
107. See Buse, supra note 1, at 1524-39. Proposing various arbitration procedures to pro-
vide the employers with a better understanding of the transaction and to ensure the arbitration
proceedings are conducted in a fair manner. Id
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